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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JOSE MORALES-TORRES, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20000680-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from the district court's quashal of one count of arranging to 
distribute controlled substances (cocaine), a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 58-37-8-(l)(a)(ii) (1998 & Supp. 2000). This Court has jurisdiction under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (1999) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue. Did the district court erroneously quash the bindover order on a charge of 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance in the face of evidence from which a trier 
of fact could reasonably infer that defendant intended to arrange for the undercover 
officers to purchase cocaine? 
Preservation. This issue was preserved by the district court's granting of the 
motion to quash the bindover order (R. 113-118). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. "[T]he ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant 
over for trial presents a question of law" which is reviewed "de novo without deference." 
State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 
43 (Utah App. 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any pertinent constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are quoted below: 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: . . . distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1999 & Supp. 2000). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with arranging to distribute cocaine, a second degree 
felony (R.2-5). The preliminary hearing was held on 6 April 2000 and defendant was 
bound over as charged (R. 131:18) (a complete copy of the transcript is contained in 
addendum A). Thereafter, on 7 June 2000, defendant moved to quash the bindover in 
district court, claiming that the State had failed to establish a prima facie case of 
arranging under State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 3 P.3d 725, cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 
Utah 2000), which was issued on 2 June 2000 (R. 35-40) (copies of the motion and 
supporting memorandum are contained in addendum B). The State filed a ' 
memorandum opposing the motion and distinguishing Hester (R. 91) (a complete copy 
of the State's opposing memorandum is contained in addendum C). The district court 
2 
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granted defendant's motion and entered an order quashing the bindover order (R. 113-
114) (a copy is contained in addendum D). An order of dismissal was entered thereafter 
(R. 118-119). The State timely appealed (R. 120). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On 8 March 2000, Officer Portel of the Salt Lake City Police Department was 
working in an undercover narcotics operation in the downtown area (R. 131: 4). 
Specifically, Officer Portel and another undercover officer watched defendant and two 
other males standing by a pay phone located at 575 West and 200 South, in Salt Lake 
City Utah, leave and return within a 30 minute time frame (R. 131: 5-6). After observing 
this conduct, the officers pulled over next to the sidewalk and Officer Portel, the 
passenger, gave defendant a "nod," a method of communication Officer Portel uses to 
contact drug dealers (R. 131:6-7). Defendant nodded back to Officer Portel and 
approached the truck (R. 131: 7). Officer Portel asked defendant if he could "hook 
[them] up" (id.). When defendant asked what they needed, Officer Portel said "Coca," 
meaning Cocaine (R. 131: 8). Defendant then asked for thirty-five cents to use the pay 
phone, which Officer Portel declined to give him (id.). Instead, Officer Portel offered to 
let defendant use her cellular phone and he accepted (R. 131: 8-9). 
%
 With Officer Porters help, defendant called a pager number and then waited for a 
return call (R. 131: 9). Within one minute the cell phone rang and defendant had a 
conversation in Spanish with the caller (id.). Officer Portel does not speak Spanish and 
3 
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did not understand the phone conversation (R. 131:9, 16). When defendant finished the 
call, he said they needed to drive to 700 South and 900 West because the man who had 
the drugs was at that location eating lunch and he wanted them to drive out there to meet 
him (R. 131: 9). Defendant asked to ride with the officers, but the officers would not 
allow him to get in their truck (R. 131: 10). Officer Portel asked if the other man could 
meet them at their present location, or if the officers could meet the man without 
defendant (id.). Defendant, however, insisted on going, stating that the dealer knew him 
and would not deal with the officers without him (id.). When Officer Portel declined to 
participate in the deal, defendant walked away (R. 131: 11). Shortly thereafter, he was 
arrested (id.). 
After observing defendant's arrest, the undercover officers drove to 700 South 
and 900 West to meet the dealer (R. 131: 12). Officer Portel used the same cellular 
phone she had loaned to defendant and hit redial (R. 131:13). She observed that "there 
was a guy standing in the parking lot, picked (sic) up the phone and started talking on it, 
so we said, 'Oh, that's him'" (id.). The dealer then approached the officers truck and 
said, "Oh, are you guys looking for somethingf?]" (id.). Thereafter the officers
 { 
purchased narcotics from the dealer (id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
• i 
Evidence presented at the preliminary hearing established that defendant used a 
cellular phone belonging to two undercover officers to contact a cocaine dealer on their 
4 
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behalf, and also arranged a meeting with the dealer at a specified downtown location. 
Further, defendant asked to accompany the officers to the location in order to complete 
the transaction, but was refused. Thereafter, defendant walked away and was arrested. 
Meanwhile, the officers traveled to the meeting location where they identified the dealer 
by hitting redial on their cell phone, and watching to see who responded to the call. 
Thereafter, they completed the drug transaction with the dealer. Viewing this evidence 
in the light most favorable to prosecution and drawing all inferences in favor of the 
prosecution, defendant should have been bound over on a charge of arranging to 
distribute cocaine. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY QUASHED THE 
BINDOVER ORDER ON A CHARGE OF ARRANGING TO 
DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE DESPITE 
EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A TRIER OF FACT COULD 
REASONABLY INFER DEFENDANT'S INTENTION TO 
ARRANGE FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF COCAINE 
The district court's quashal of the bindover order on a charge of arranging to 
distribute controlled substance on these facts misapprehends what is required by the 
bindover standard, the arranging statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(a)(l)(ii) (Supp. 
1998), and State v. Hester, 2000 Utah App 159, 3 P.3d 725. The district court's 
erroneous rulings quashing the bindover order and dismissing the information should 
therefore be reversed. 
5 
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Bindover standard. At a preliminary hearing, "the prosecution must present 
evidence sufficient for the magistrate to find [pjrobable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." State v. Talbot, 
972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
"Furthermore, [t]he prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to establish 
the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence 
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the trier of fact." Id. (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). This probable cause standard "is lower, even, than a 
preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases." Id. (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
Moreover, "in determining whether this standard of probable cause has been 
satisfied, the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution." Id. at 437-38 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Additionally, "[ujnless the evidence is 
wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports 
the [prosecution's] claim, the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial." Id. at
 { 
438 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Finally, Utah law recognizes a 
"presumption that the State will strengthen its evidence at trial." State v. Pledger, 896 
P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1995) (quoting Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d 503, 510 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1986)). 
6 
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Elements of Arranging to Distribute Controlled Substance. Defendant was 
charged with arranging to distribute cocaine. A person commits the offense of arranging 
if he knowingly and intentionally distributes a controlled or counterfeit substance, or 
agrees, consents, offers, or arranges to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1999 & Supp. 2000). 
In Utah, "any witting or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, 
whatever form it takes," amounts to the criminal offense of arranging. State v. Harrison, 
601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979). See also State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah App. 
1990) (recognizing that "any act in furtherance of 'arranging] to distribute . . a . . . 
controlled substance' constitutes a criminal offense pursuant to the statute") (quotation 
omitted), cert denied, P.2d (Utah February 21,1991). The "agreement" to 
arrange distribution is thus the actus reus of the offense of arranging. State v. Scott, 732 
P.2d 117,120 (Utah 1987). This is true even if nothing of value is ultimately exchanged 
or distributed. Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924 n.5. Rather, "[a]ll that is needed is the 
arrangement of such distribution, coupled with knowledge or intent." Id. See also State 
v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 (Utah App. 1989). 
Ruling below. The district court's quashal of the bindover order makes clear that 
it found the evidence insufficient to establish that defendant agreed and/or intended to 
arrange for the distribution of cocaine because 
7 
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(1) the conversation that defendant had with a so called dealer was not 
understood by Officer Portel because it was in the Spanish language and 
she did not understand what was said nor to whom; 
(2) it was clear that defendant never had any drugs; 
(3) defendant never mentioned] cocaine or any drug; 
(4) police officers broke off negotiations with defendant and he walked off; 
(5) officers made further contact with drug dealer(s) on their own, 
conducted negotiations; and 
(6) there was no evidence that defendant had anything to do with the 
dealers that the officer eventually consummated a drug transaction 
(R. 113-114), add. D. 
Analysis. Contrary to the district court's reasoning, defendant's conduct clearly 
falls within the wide range of culpable conduct prohibited in section 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii). 
Indeed, defendant's conduct reasonably suggests his agreement to arrange for the 
distribution of cocaine even if he never had drugs on his person, never said the word 
coca, or cocaine, and was ultimately cut out of the transaction before its completion. As 
set out previously, nothing more than the agreement to arrange for the distribution is 
required. Scott, 732 P.2d at 120; Clark, 783 P.2d at 69. < 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing was sufficient to infer that defendant paged a cocaine dealer on the 
officers' behalf (R. 131:8-10). Even though defendant's phone conversation was 
conducted in Spanish, the reasonable inference is that the caller was the cocaine dealer 
8 
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defendant had just paged (id.). This is because the officers told him they wanted cocaine 
immediately before defendant placed the page, and at the conclusion of the call, 
defendant announced in English that he and the officers needed to travel to a specified 
location to meet with the dealer to conclude the drug transaction (id.). Thus, while 
defendant did not himself utter the words coca or cocaine, the reasonable inference is that 
he arranged for the officers to purchase such. This inference is not negated by the fact 
that defendant was "stopped short" of his intended purpose when the officers refused to 
allow him to accompany them to the dealer's location. See Francis v. State, 890 S.W.2d 
510, 513 (Tex. App. 1994) (affirming arranging conviction even though defendant was 
inadvertently "stopped short of his intended purpose of an actual delivery"of controlled 
substance).1 
Because the district court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution and to draw the reasonable inference that defendant intended to arrange 
for the distribution of cocaine, it erred as a matter of law in quashing the bindover order. 
Hester distinguished. In addition to misapplying the bindover standard, the 
district court also erroneously relied upon this Court's recent opinion in State v. Hester, 
specifically, as in this case, Francis did not expressly state he had cocaine for 
sale, but rather offered to obtain such when the undercover officers requested it. Id. at 
513. While the officers agreed to let Francis accompany them to the location where he 
claimed he could get "some," Francis unexpectedly opened the sliding door to the 
surveillance van, exposing the surveillance team, before the transaction could be 
completed. Id. at 511. 
9 
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2000 Utah App 159, 3 P.3d 725, Although the district court did not elucidate his reason 
for relying on Hester (R. 113), Hester's resemblance to the case at bar is superficial. 
In Hester, the State argued unsuccessfully in the preliminary hearing court and on 
appeal that Hester should have been bound over on a charge of arranging because 
"Hester told the undercover officer that he had cocaine, accepted money from the officer, 
and told the officer to 'wait there.'" Id. at ^ 5. On appeal, this Court emphasized, on the 
other hand, that Hester was arrested before the drug transaction was concluded, and 
police found no cocaine on his person at that time. Id. at f 3. Additionally, Hester had 
spoken to no one, nor had he made any phone calls after leaving the undercover detective 
in that case. Id. Therefore, this Court found that there was "no particular indication that 
[Hester] was going to meet a supplier or otherwise actually procure cocaine or arrange 
for its delivery to [the undercover detective]." Id. 
Rather than allowing events to unfold a while longer, the police moved to 
quickly to apprehend Hester without even knowing if he had any controlled 
substances on him (he did not), or if any other party was involved in the 
transaction (none was identified), or if he had some other means to get the 
cocaine delivered to [the undercover detective] (none was shown). 
Id. at 14. The Court thus upheld the magistrate's refusal to bind over. 
In so ruling, however, the Court acknowledged that, "Even absent proof of a 
completed distribution, there are other types of evidence which can be used to reveal the 
defendant's intent by showing that the defendant took active steps to facilitate the 
completion of an illicit transaction." Id. at f 12. The Court further acknowledged that 
10 
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even an "aborted transaction can serve as the basis for an 'arranging' conviction, if the 
surrounding facts indicate that the defendant intended to facilitate a completed drug 
sale." Id. The problem in Hester, where there was no evidence of a completed sale, was 
the State's failure to produce "evidence that Hester took active steps to facilitate the 
distribution of cocaine[.]" Id. at ^  13. In a footnote, the Court indicated that 
Such evidence could include that Hester made phone calls seeking drugs, 
drove around looking for drugs, commented to Cardon on how the drugs 
were to be acquired, was seen conferring with known drug suppliers, or 
was shown to be a iink in a chain' of distribution. 
Id. at f^ 13, n.6 (citations omitted). 
Here, unlike Hester, the State presented evidence that defendant not only took 
active steps to facilitate the distribution of cocaine, but was also a critical "link in a 
chain"of distribution leading to the completed transaction. Id. at ^ | 12 (citation omitted). 
Indeed, as set forth previously, defendant facilitated the transaction by paging the dealer, 
arranging a meeting, and providing the dealer's location to the undercover officers (R. 
131:8-10). Moreover, the transaction in this case was ultimately completed despite 
defendant's absence, precisely because he had already told the officers where to find the 
dealer, and because the officers were able to redial on their cell phone the same pager 
number defendant initially used to contact the dealer (R. 131: 9,13). Given these 
distinctions, illustrating that what was absent in Hester was present here, the district 
court erroneously relied on Hester to quash the bindover order. 
11 
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Finally, defendant's conduct is not analytically distinguishable from that of the 
defendant in Pelton. Like Pelton, defendant "was one link in a chain of events," which 
eventually led to the sale of cocaine. Id. at 185. Pelton directed an undercover agent to 
drive to a 7-Eleven store where they were to make a phone call and then "'the man would 
bring the cocaine to that location.'" Id. Once at the 7-Eleven, Pelton and another 
individual got out of the car and spoke to a man in a telephone booth, who turned out to 
be the dealer. Id. Pelton, however, did not further participate in the drug transaction, 
which was "consummated" only after he left the area. Id. This means that Pelton, like 
defendant, never possessed the cocaine at issue, never discussed prices or handled 
money, and was not present at the time of the purchase. Id. at 185-186. Therefore, 
defendant's conduct in similarly linking up the officers in this case with a cocaine dealer 
is as culpable as that of Pelton's, who was ultimately convicted for arranging under the 
higher, reasonable doubt standard applicable at trial. See also State v. Gallegos, 851 
P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Utah App. 1993) (affirming conviction for arranging based solely 
on Gallegos' representations as to the availability of narcotics made over the telephone to 
potential buyers); Clark, 783 P.2d at 70 (affirming arranging conviction in absence of
 ( 
completed transaction where defendant made incriminating statements to undercover 
officers, attempted to contact dealer, was present during negotiations with dealer, and 
warned of a tailing car). 
12 
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At the preliminary hearing, the State presented abundant evidence which, when 
viewed "in a light most favorable to the prosecution" was not "wholly lacking and 
incapable of reasonable inference to prove" that defendant agreed to arrange the 
distribution of cocaine. Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38. The district court thus erred in 
quashing the bind over order. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's orders quashing the bindover order and dismissing the 
information should be reversed and the case remanded for entry of an order binding 
defendant over for trial on a charge of arranging to distribute cocaine. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on £_ December 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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THE 
P R O C E E D T N G S 
COURT: State vs. Morales-Torres, Jose 
Morales-Torres. 
MR. 
prelim, but— 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
VALDEZ: That's mine, Judge. That's a quick 
COURT: But we don't have a prosecutor? 
VALDEZ: We don't have an interpreter. 
COURT: We have~oh, you're doing it? Okay. 
We just need an interpreter. We lost—who was the 
interpreter that was here? Tell me that one was ordered. 
MR. WILLIAMS: Why don't we call him out and 
let's—ask him some questions, see—how is your English? 
Is your English good enough that you don't need an 
interpreter? 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
one. 
THE 
MR. 
you need one? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
Huh? 
MORALES-TORRES: I don't think so. 
WILLIAMS: You don't think so. 
VALDEZ: I asked him, he said he didn't need 
COURT: Well— 
WILLIAMS: You don't need an interpreter or 
MORALES-TORRES: (Inaudible) 
COURT: You don't need it? 
VALDEZ: Okay. Any problems, you let me 
2 
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know, all right? 
MR. MORALES-TORRES: Uh huh. 
MR. VALDEZ: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. The same here, Mr. Morales-
Torres. You're—we can get an interpreter, we'll look for 
one if you want to wait. 
MR. MORALES-TORRES: No. That's okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. You understand? 
MR. MORALES-TORRES: Yeah, I understand, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. If you don't understand, you 
just speak up. 
MR. MORALES-TORRES: Uh huh. 
THE COURT: Okay? All right. We don't need one, 
I guess. If we can get one... 
All right. Let me go on the record then and say, 
this is the State of Utah vs. Jose Morales-Torres, who's 
present and—and uncuffed, so you can write a note there to 
Mr. Valdez if you need to. 
Mr. Valdez represents you and Mr. Nielsen's here 
for the State. You have the second-degree felony, 
distribution, offering, agreeing or arranging to distribute 
and I'm assuming again, you waive reading of that. 
MR. VALDEZ: We do, Judge. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead, Mr. Nielsen. 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, the State would call 
3 
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Officer Portel. 
THE COURT: All right* Have her come forward and 
be sworn. 
Go ahead. 
ANSELINE PQRTEL, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
witness stand and was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MRt NIELSEN; 
Q Officer, would you please state your full name, 
spell your last and state with whom you're employed? 
A Angeline Portel, P-o-r-t-e-1. I'm a police 
officer with Salt Lake City Police Department. 
Q And how long have you been so employed? 
A Three-and-a-half years. 
Q And have you had formal training in regard to 
narcotics investigations? 
A I have. 
Q Okay* Were you on duty on March 8th of the year 
2000? 
A I was. 
Q Okay. And did you have occasion to be in the 
area of approximately 15—575 West 200 South? 
A Yes. I was. 
4 
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Q And what were you in that area for? 
A We were working in an undercover narcotics 
operation, we were targeting street level narcotics 
distribution in the downtown area. 
Q Okay. Did you see a particular individual in 
that area that caught you attention as being someone 
involved? 
A Yes. I noticed—I noticed Mr. Morales. 
Q Okay. And is that person present in the 
courtroom today? 
A He is. 
Q Would you point to him and describe what he's 
wearing? 
A There, wearing that orange jumpsuit. 
MR. NIELSEN: May the record reflect 
identification? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. NIELSEN: Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Nielsen) And what was it that caught 
your attention to the defendant? 
A When I saw him, he was standing at a pay phone at 
that address with two white males that I had never seen in 
the area before and I work in this area every day. And 
they were making a phone call and then standing by the 
phone, as if waiting for a call to be returned. And they 
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were there for quite some time. 
Q Okay. Did at some point these three people 
leave? 
A Yes. One of the white males left separately and 
then one walked off later, in the same direction, with Mr. 
Morales. 
Q Okay. Did you later again see Mr. Morales? 
A I did. I saw him about maybe 30 minutes later, 
by himself, standing by the same pay phone. 
Q Okay. Was he using the phone? 
A No. 
Q Okay. Did at some point you approach Mr. Morales 
or did he approach you? 
A He was walking down the sidewalk starting to, you 
know, leave the pay phone that he'd been standing by and we 
pulled over next to the sidewalk and I kind of gave him a 
head nod. 
Q Okay. Who was with you? 
A Officer Charman. 
Q And what kind of vehicle were you in? 
A We were in a Ford pickup truck. 
Q And were both of you undercover? 
A Yes. 
Q Plain clothes? 
A Yes. 
6 
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Q Okay. And you gave a head nod to Mr. Morales? 
A I did. 
Q And what did he do back? 
A He nodded to me, he stopped and walked over to 
the truck. 
Q Okay. Based on your experience and training, 
what usually are head nods used for on the street? 
A They're just used by buyers to communicate with 
drug dealers. Frequently, you need to make some sort of 
eye contact, head nod, wave. 
MR. VALDEZ: Well, I'll object to that 
conclusion, I think she can testify as to what she uses it 
for when she's working in an undercover capacity. 
THE COURT: You think she can testify to what? 
MR. VALDEZ: What she uses head nods for when 
she's working in an undercover capacity, but everybody— 
THE COURT: Oh. Overruled. 
MR. VALDEZ: —nods their heads. 
MR. NIELSEN: All right. 
Q (By Mr. Nielsen) Did you— 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Nielsen) Did you ask Mr. Morales 
anything when he approached the vehicle? 
A I think that I asked him, Can you hook us up? 
Q Okay. Were you the passenger in this truck? 
7 
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A I was. 
Q Okay. And he approached the passenger side? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And what did he say after you asked hira if 
he could—if he could hook you up? 
A He—he asked what we needed. 
Q And did you tell him? 
A I told him coca. 
Q Did— 
A Meaning cocaine. 
Q Did you tell him how much? 
A I don't remember. 
Q Okay. Was this in— 
A Probably. 
Q Probably? 
A Probably, but I don't remember. 
Q Was this in English or Spanish? 
A English. 
Q Okay. What was Mr. Morales' response to your 
request for some coca? 
A He asked me for thirty-five cents for the pay 
phone. 
Q And what did you tell him? 
A We didn't have any change with us, so we let him 
use one of our cell phones. 
8 
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Q Okay. Did he in fact use that cell phone? 
A He did. 
Q And did he make a call on that? 
A Yes. He—I helped him, he—we paged a number 
together on the police cell phone and waited for the call 
to come back. About 30 seconds later, the phone rang and 
he had a conversation in Spanish with somebody. 
Q Were there any other phone calls or paging or 
just that one paging and one returned call? 
A Just the one. 
Q Okay. After he got off the phone, having the 
conversation in Spanish, what did he do? 
A He told us that we needed to go to 700 South and 
Ninth West and—because the guy that had the drugs was 
eating lunch and he wanted us to drive out there and meet 
him. 
Q Okay. Did he specifically say that you would 
have to meet the guy there for drugs or for cocaine or to 
do the deal? Do you remember what language he— 
MR. VALDEZ: That's leading. I will object. 
THE COURTS Yeah. 
Q (By Mr. Nielsen) Do you remember what his 
specific words were? 
A I—I think that he just said, we need to go to 
that address and meet the guy 'cause he's eating right now 
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and I don't think that he said anything specifically about 
drugs or cocaine at that point. 
Q Okay. What did you tell Mr. Morales at that 
point? 
A Well, we have a rule where we can't—we can't 
ride with the guy that's going to set us up— 
MR. VALDEZ: That's non—that's non-responsive. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Nielsen) Okay. What—what did you tell 
Mr. Morales after he told you you'd have to go to that 
other location? 
A I let him walk over to the truck and then Officer 
Charman told him that we couldn't ride with him. 
Q Okay. He wanted to get in the truck? 
A Yeah. He wanted to get in the truck and ride 
with us over there. 
Q Okay. Did, at any point, he get in the truck? 
A Mo. 
Q Okay. Did you tell him something in regard, that 
you'd meet him somewhere or how were you going to meet at 
the other location? 
A We tried to negotiate the deal where maybe we 
could call the guy back and get him to come to where we 
were and he didn't want to do that. And we said, well, can 
we just go on our own and go meet him and he said that he 
10 
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had to come with us because the guy knows him, the dealer 
would know him and not us. 
Q Okay. Did he make any particular comments at any 
time about what exactly would go on when you went to this 
other location? 
A NO. 
Q And based on your conversations with Mr. Morales, 
what was the reason for going—that you understood to be 
for going to this other location? 
A To purchase cocaine. 
Q Okay. And when these negotiations failed, what 
then did you do? 
A We told him that we weren't going to do the deal 
then, that we weren't going to drive out there and he said 
okay and he walked up—down the sidewalk and we just had 
him picked tip then. 
Q Okay. Who picked him up? 
A Officer Smith and Officer Budea. 
Q Okay. Did you see the officers when they picked 
him up? 
A We did. 
Q So you maintained a visual on him the whole time? 
A We did. 
Q Okay. So you were able to identify that the 
person they stopped was in fact the same person who had— 
11 
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A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
—been talking to you? 
Yes. 
Q Okay. What did they do with the defendant, do 
you know? 
A They searched him real quick and then put him in 
the back of the police, had him held in there for awhile. 
Q You had no more— 
A Before taking him to jail, I guess. 
Q You had no more involvement with him? 
A No. I didn't. 
Q Okay. Did you later look at the cell phone that 
Mr. Morales had used? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. 
A We decided that we were going to go to the 
Seventh South Ninth West address. 
Q And that was because your conversation about the 
meeting there? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. 
A He said that his dealer was there and since we 
couldn't ride with him, we decided that we would just go 
there on our own anyway and try to find the guy. 
Q Okay. Did you go to that location then? 
12 
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A Yes. 
Q Okay. Did you find anybody there? 
A Yes. We did. 
Q How did you find that person? 
A The number that he paged on the cell phone was 
saved in the cell phone's memory, so we just paged it 
again. 
Q Okay. 
A And when—there was a guy standing in the parking 
lot, picked up the phone and started talking on it, so we 
said, Oh, that's him. 
Q So, you made eye contact with the person who 
answered that number which you paged? 
A Yeah. He approached our truck and he came over 
and he said, Oh, are you guys looking for something and we 
started working a deal with him and he said, yeah, you just 
paged me. 
Q Okay* 
A So— 
Q And just—just briefly, was a drug transaction, 
did a drug transaction later develop out of that incident? 
A Yes. It did. 
Q Okay. And narcotics were purchased? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. 
13 
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MR. NIELSEN: I have nothing further, your Honor, 
THE COURT: Mr. Valdez? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
3Y MRt VALDEZ; 
Q Did that latter drug transaction, was that 
person—did that person look like he spoke Spanish? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q With the latter drug transaction that you made? 
A Yeah. 
Q Same phone number? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q The first guy that when he—when you called and 
you said a guy picked it up and he came over to you, did— 
is he a person that you think might speak Spanish? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And what was his name? Was he arrested? 
A He was arrested and I think his name was Victor 
Clinton. 
Q Okay. And he's listed on the Information; isn't 
that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Along with two other people? 
A Yes. 
Q Those other people are Ronald Wooley and Roger 
Willy? 
14 
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A Yes. 
Q Okay. And do you see at least one of those 
people in Court today? Those— 
A Of the three you just listed? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q You haven't seen any of them here today? 
A Oh, I've—yeah. We saw Willy. 
Q Okay. 
A Mr. Willy. 
Q All right. 
A I guess. 
Q Now, Mr. Morales, you never gave him any money? 
A No. 
Q Okay. He never gave you any—anything that might 
look like a controlled substance? 
A No. 
Q Okay. And then when you kept using the term 
"dealer11, he never said "dealer11, did he? 
A I couldn't say. Probably not. 
Q Okay. He said something else, but you assumed it 
was a dealer? 
A Right. 
Q Is that correct? Or his dealer? All right. 
So, the negotiations you say broke off with him 
15 
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and he started walking away and then you had him arrested. 
A That's right. 
Q That was before anything else occurred with these 
other individuals then; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. You never used him to talk to those 
individuals thereafter? 
A No. 
Q And apparently he was seated in the police car 
when those other individuals were arrested? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. You don't speak Spanish? 
A Very little. 
Q Okay. So you didn't know what he was talking 
about when he was on the phone then; is that correct? 
A No. I can't remember what he—he—it was a 
conversation in Spanish and he turned away from me and I— 
Q You didn't hear it then? 
A NO. 
Q Now, all other—all other conversations with Mr. 
Morales were in English? 
A Yes. 
Q And you used terms like, you asked him, "Can you 
hook us up"? 
A Yeah. 
16 
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Q Is that—is that the exact term that you used? 
A Probably. 
Q And—and I guess a response was, "For what"? 
A Coca. 
Q I mean, but his response was "For what"? 
And you said—you said "Coca"? 
A What—I said coca. He said, What do you need and 
I said coca. 
Q Okay. Did he ever use the word "coca"? 
A Unless he was talking to the guy on the phone, 
the one— 
Q You didn't hear him use the word "coca"? 
A I don't think so* 
Q You're the one that used the word "coca"? 
A Uh huh. 
Q You're the one that used the word "hook—hook us 
up" or the—the term "hook us up"? 
A Right. 
Q And I guess he, in some way, form or way, said to 
you, I know somebody down the street? At least later he 
indicated he's down the street? 
A Right. 
MR. VALDEZ: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. NIELSEN: No, your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Thank you. You may step down. 
MR. NIELSEN: State would rest, your Honor. 
MR. VALDEZ: We—we would rest, your Honor. 
I'll indicate to Mr. Morales that he has the 
right to make a statement. I'll advise him not to make a 
statement at this time. Will you take my advice? 
You have the right to—you have a right to 
testify. It's my advice that you not testify. 
Okay. Take my advice? 
MR. MORALES-TORRES: Yeah. 
MR. VALDEZ: All right.
 m 
THE COURT: Okay. Submit it? 
MR. NIELSEN: Submit it. 
(Inaudible) 
THE COURT: Well, let me, first, before you talk 
about all that, find probable cause to believe that the 
crime alleged here, Mr. Morales-Torres, was committed, the 
offering—distribution, offering or agreeing or arranging, 
a second-degree, and also reason to believe that you 
committed the offense based upon the testimony. So, I'm 
going to order that you stand trial and that would be set 
then for sentence—for sentencing—for scheduling, and I'm 
going to again assume that you waive reading, enter not 
guilty pleas for purposes of arraignment. 
MR. VALDEZ: Yes. 
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THE CLERK: Before Judge Barrett, on April 17 at 
8:30. 
THE COURT: Okay. On the 17th of April at 8:30 
in the morning before Judge Barrett. 
MR. VALDEZ: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And we'll excuse you on that and you 
can talk to him about—I think he was talking drug programs 
or something. 
MR. VALDEZ: He was—yeah, he was talking 
(inaudible) 
MR. NIELSEN: That's all I have, your Honor. May 
I be excused? 
THE COURT: Not that I wanted to hear. 
You bet. We'll excuse everybody. We're in 
recess. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* # # 
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within 
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same 
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 
to 19, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a 
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is 
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were 
inaudible* 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 14th day of 
October, 2000• 
^ VM^£ Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1 4 t h day 
of October, 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P. SMITH 
^ ? BRAHMA DRIVE 
MURRAY, UT S4107 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 4, 2001 
STATE OF UTAH 
o 
Notary Pub 75T 
( S E A L ) 
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically recorded 
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 19, inclusive, to the best of my 
knowledge, constitute a full, true.and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of 
October, 2000* 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAN P. SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 
MURRAY. UT 84107 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 4, 2001 
STATE OF UTAH ( S E A L ) 
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JAMES A. VALDEZ #3308 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DIVISION 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JOSE MORALES-TORRES 
Defendant 
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER 
OR DISMISS. 
CaseNo.001904616FS 
CAO 00-00-5277 
JUDGE WILLIAM BARRETT 
The Defendant, JOSE MORALES-TORRES, by and through counsel, JAMES A. 
VALDEZ, moves the Court to quash the bindover for trial which was granted April 6th, 2000, 
based upon an opinion by the Utah Court of Appeals filed and released for publication on June 
2nd, 2000, State v.Hester. 2000 UT App 159, (2000). A supporting Memorandum is filed 
herewith. 
DATED this 7^ day of June, 2000. 
.DEZ #3308 
iey for Jose Morales-Torres 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy otfhe foregoing to the Office of the District 
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 7f day of June, 2000. 
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JAMES A. VALDEZ # 3308 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
E-mail: ivaldez@sllda.com 
9" 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DIVISION 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOSE MORALES-TORRES 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM AND SUPPORTING 
AUTHORITY EN RE: MOTION TO 
QUASH BINDOVER OR DISMISS. 
Case No. 001904616FS 
CAO 00-00-5277 
JUDGE WILLIAM BARRETT 
FACTS 
Police officer Angeline Portal indicates in her police reports and testified at 
Preliminary Hearing held on April 6,2000 before Honorable Sheila McCleve that she and 
other officers were working in the area of 575 West 200 South when they seen the defendant 
Jose Morales-Torres. She indicates "we approached him and asked him if he could, 'Hook us 
up'. He laughed and walked over to the vehicle. He asked us what we needed and I told him I 
wanted ' coca.' He asked me if I had thirty five cents for the pay phone." Officer Portal 
testified and wrote in her report that they did not have any change but let him use their police 
issued cell phone. She then states" I told him if he got us a deal I'd give him ten 
bucks." [Portal report] 
She then walked with him and watched as he paged someone and received a return call a 
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short time later wherein he conducted a conversation in Spanish which she (officer Portel) was 
unable to understand. She further reports that he wanted a ride to a location at 700 South 900 
West. The officers refused to give him a ride and arrested him for arranging the sale of 
narcotics. 
Officers then went over to the a restaurant "El Popular" at 700 South 900 West and one 
officer entered in an attempt to locate a "Dealer". None was located so Officers used a different 
cell phone to call the numbers that were in the memory the cell phone that Morales had used. 
They made contact with a Victor Clinton outside in the parking lot of "El Popular" Restaurant 
who noticed that they were on the phone attempting to contact him. At the time he was 
standing with Ronald Justo Woolery. 
Police reports indicate that the negotiations involved Woolery as the main supplier of the 
narcotic. Clinton was the contact to Woolery and Roger D. Willey was another buyer. [Sharman 
report]. 
Negotiations were conducted with Woolery, prerecorded buy money was used to make 
purchase from Woolery and Clinton after some elaborate efforts at acquiring the substances and 
transportation to yet other locations and eventually the deal was completed and the take down 
officers notified and arrests made. Upon arrests being made of Woolery and Clinton some of the 
pre-recorded buy money was located in Clinton's right front pocket There is no indication as to 
whether any of the arrested people other than Mr. Morales spoke Spanish. 
ARQVMENT 
THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT 
ESTABLISHED THE QUANTUM OF 
EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO BIND 
OVER AS SET FORTH IN STATE v. 
HgSTER, 
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Mr. Morales-Torres did nothing more than furnish the undercover a pager and telephone 
number. Once the officers arrested Mr. Morales, they conducted their own negotiations with 
Woolery and in fact all remaining transactions did not involve Mr. Morales. 
State v. Hester 2000 UT App 159, (2000) the defendant Tracy Raymon Hester was 
contacted by an undercover police officer when the officer pulled up to a curb near where Hester 
was standing and said something. When he walked over to the vehicle the officer asked Hester 
if he had any Mchiva.'\ Hester's reply was "No, baby, I don't [;] only coke." took twenty 
dollars from the officer told her to "wait there" and walked away. He was arrested and charged 
with one count of arranging distribute a controlled substance. 
At the conclusion of the Preliminary Hearing, defense counsel moved to dismiss on the 
ground that the State had failed to present evidence sufficient even to support a reasonable 
inference that Hester actually intended to arrange for the distribution of a controlled substance-
as opposed to just stealing the officers money. The magistrate granted the defense motion and 
refused to bind Hester over. The State appealed the dismissal and the Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed the magistrates decision. 
To be guilty of arranging, the defendant must have committed some "act in furtherance of 
arrangement" to distribute controlled substances. As part of its prima facie case of arranging, the 
State must prove that the defendant acted with the knowledge or intent that his actions would 
result in the distribution of a controlled substance. 
Here police officers closed off any further discussions with Mr. Morales and arrested him. 
They then made contact with the "Dealers" and conducted and concluded negotiations on their 
own. Mr. Morales took no part in the completed distribution and the only active step that 
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Morales can be shown to have taken was an unsuccessful phone call and his unwitting furnishing 
of the phone number.. 
The court in Hester, in discussing whether intent to facilitate a drug transaction can 
logically be inferred from the thin circumstantial evidence in the Hester facts said: 
. . . "While it is sometimes subtle, there is in fact a difference 
between drawing a reasonable inference and merely speculating 
about possibilities. An inference is 'a conclusion reached by 
considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from 
them/ Blacks Law Dictionary 781 (7th ed. 1999V Stated 
another way,' [a]n inference is a deduction as to the existence 
of a fact which human experience teaches us can reasonably 
and logically be drawn from proof of other facts/ Manchester 
v. DucaiL 247 A.2d 827, 829 (Me. 1968). On the other hand, 
speculation is defined as the4 act or practice of theorizing about 
matters over which there is no certain knowledge.' Black's Law 
Dictionary 1407 (7th ed. 1999). 
In reality, there is no black line between inference and speculation 
-both are way stations along a continuum that has absolute 
Certainty at one extreme and complete impossibility at the other. 
' When the correlation between the predicate facts and 'at some 
point, the link between the facts and the conclusion becomes so\ 
tenuous that we call it "speculation."4" State v. Copas. 746 A. 2d 
761,782 (Conn.2000) (Katz, J. Dissenting) (quoting Goldhirsh 
Group, Inc. v. Alnert 107 F.3d 105.108 (2nd Cir. 199T> V 
What if anything Mr. Morales said on the phone is unknown, because is was conducted in 
Spanish and not understood by the officers. Additionally he was immediately arrested and made 
to wait in custody for a long period of time whilst the officers made contact on their own, 
conducted negotiations on their own, transported and traveled to other locations one their own, 
and finally exchanged money with people other than Mr. Morales, on their own. 
CONCLUSION 
The Prosecution has failed to establish the quantum of evidence necessary to establish 
^>r\ 
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a prima facie case of arranging the distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-8(1) (a)(ii) Supp. 1999). And pursuant to State v. 
Hester. 2000 UT App 159, (2000). (Released for publication on June 2nd, 2000 after the 
bindover). 
Mr. Morales by and through his attorney James A. Valdez respectfully prays the 
finding of probable cause and bindover be hereby quashed and the matter remanded to the 
Magistrate Court for consideration and findings consistent with State v. Hester, or in the 
alternative, PRAY that this Court make findings consistent with Hester, and dismiss the charges 
against JOSE MORALES-TORRES with prejudice. 
DATED this 26th day of June, 2000. 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the forgoing Memorandum to Matt Nielsen, Deputy 
District Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 26th day of June, 2000. 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KELLY R. SHEFFIELD, Bar No. 5869 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSE MORALES-TORRES, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
QUASH THE BINDOVER 
Case'No. 001904616FS 
CAO 00-00-5277 
JUDGE WILLIAM BARRET 
The State of Utah, by and through its counsel, David E. Yocom, Salt Lake County 
District Attorney, and Kelly R. Sheffield, Deputy District Attorney, respectfully submits 
this Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover. 
FACTS 
The defendant has been charged with Unlawful Distribution, Offering, 
Consenting or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled or Counterfeit Substance. Utah Code 
Ann. 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1953). On March 08,2000, at 575 West 200 South, in Salt Lake 
County, Officer Portel with the Salt Lake City Police Department was working on an 
undercover narcotics operation targeting street level narcotics distribution in the 
downtown area. Officer Portel made contact with the defendant after observing him and 
Omtf^ 
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two other males standing near a pay phone. The defendant left with one of the males and 
then returned to the area of the pay phone within 30 minutes. Officer Portel and Officer 
Scharman, both undercover and in plain clothes, pulled over next to the sidewalk near the 
defendant and gave him a nod, a method of communication Officer Portel uses as a buyer 
to contact drug dealers. At that point, the defendant approached the vehicle where 
Officer Portel asked the defendant if he could "hook us up." The defendant responded by 
asking her what she needed, which she answered by requesting cocaine. The defendant 
then asked for change to use the pay phone. When Officer Portel declined to give him 
money, she offered to allow him to use her cellular phone. The defendant used the phone 
and called a pager number and then waited for a call. Within one minute the phone rang 
and the defendant had a conversation in Spanish. Officer Portel does not speak Spanish 
and was unable to understand the phone conversation. When the defendant finished his 
conversation, he stated that they needed to go to 700 South and 900 West because the 
man who had the drugs was at that location eating lunch and he wanted them to drive out 
there to meet him. The defendant wanted to ride with the Officers over to the other 
location but was not allowed to enter the vehicle. Officer Portel began to negotiate the 
deal so that the other man could meet them there or if the Officers could meet the other 
man without the defendant. The defendant insisted on going stating that the other man 
knew him and would not deal with the Officers without him. Officer Portel declined to 
participate in the deal and the defendant walked away. The defendant was then picked up 
by Officers Smith and Farillas. 
After observing the arrest of the defendant, Officer Portel went to the location of 
700 South and 900 West where the defendant had arranged the meeting between them 
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and the man that would sell them cocaine. Officer Portel then used the cellular phone the 
defendant had used and hit redial. She observed the man answering the page then 
approached him and negotiated a drug deal. A drug sale resulted out of that transaction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE MET ITS BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE DEFENDANT COMITTED THE CRIME OF 
UNLAWFULLY ARRANGING THE DISTRIBUTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
The magistrate properly bound this case over for trial. The magistrate does not 
judge the merits of the case, but sits as a gatekeeper to the finder of fact. State v. Talbot, 
972 P.2d 435 (Utah 1998). At the conclusion of testimony, any uncertainties created by 
conflicting evidence concerning elements of the crime charged should be left for the fact 
finder to resolve at trial. State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42,45 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The 
magistrate has been directed by the Utah Supreme Court to evaluate the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in the prosecution's 
favor. State v. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). Unless the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
prosecution's claim, the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial. Pledger, 896 
P.2datl229. 
The State's burden at a preliminary hearing is not a heavy one. '"The prosecution 
is not required to introduce enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant 
submission of the case to the trier of fact.'" State v. Talbot. 972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 
1998)(quoting Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229). Furthermore, "this probable cause standard 'is 
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lower, even, than a preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil cases.'" 
Talbot, at 437 (quoting Pledger, at 1229). 
Consequently, the State met its burden by producing sufficient evidence to 
establish probable cause to believe the defendant committed the act of arranging the 
distribution of a narcotic. Therefore, the defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover 
should be denied. 
A. The Prosecution Presented Sufficient Evidence to Establish Probable Cause to 
Believe that the Defendant Committed the Act of Arranging the Distribution of a 
Controlled Substance. 
The defendant argues that the bindover should be quashed based on State v. 
Hester. 2000 UT App 159 (2000), which dismissed a case on the grounds that the State 
had failed to present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Hester 
actually intended to arrange for the distribution of a controlled substance, as opposed to 
just stealing the money. Hester, at 2, However, the Court in Hester, also stated that 
"[t]he State could have met its burden either by producing evidence of a completed sale 
of cocaine to [the officer] or evidence that Hester took active steps to facilitate the 
distribution of cocaine, even if the distribution never actually occurred." Id. at 6. 
Consequently, the facts in this case are distinguishable from Hester, in that the State 
produced evidence that the defendant took active steps to facilitate the distribution of 
cocaine. 
Further, "[t]o be guilty of arranging, the defendant must have committed some 
'act in furtherance of an arrangement' to distribute controlled substances." Hester, at 4 
(quoting State v. Harrison. 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979)). And, "the State must prove 
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that the defendant acted with the knowledge or intent that his actions would result in the 
distribution of a controlled substance." Hester, at 5. 
Nevertheless, "[i]ntent to commit a crime can be 'inferred from the actions of the 
defendant or from surrounding circumstances.'" Hester, at 5 (quoting State v. Murphy. 
674 P.2d 1220, 1223 (Utah 1983)). And it is well settled that questions of intent are 
strictly within the province of the jury. State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, the defendant asked Officer Portel what she wanted when she asked for a 
"hook up". Officer Portel specifically asked the defendant for cocaine. In response to 
Officer Porters request, the defendant made a call and set up a meeting at another / 
location witir * m » who had the-cocainec The defendant made the phone call with thy 
intent » « t op a drag transactions This is further evidenced by the fact that the defendant 
insisted on going with Officer Portel to the meeting and then commented that the deal 
would not transpire without him since the dealer would deal only with him. The actions 
of the defendant in making the phone call and setting up a meeting with a dealer at a 
specific place shows the defendant intended to arrange a drug deal. Consequently, the 
intent of the defendant to arrange the distribution of a controlled substance can be 
inferred through his actions. 
In addition, "there are other types of evidence which can be used to reveal the 
defendant's intent by showing that the defendant took active steps to facilitate the 
completion of an illicit transaction." Hester, at 5 (See State v. Galleeos. 851 P.2d 1185, 
1187, 1190-91 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). In Gallegos. the defendant made phone calls to 
find dealers to provide controlled substances to callers. The Utah Court of Appeals stated 
that the phone call making facilitated the illicit transaction. Also, when the defendant 
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brings together a buyer and a seller, the Utah Court of Appeals called it a "link in a chain 
of events." Hester, at 5 (quoting State v. Pelton. 801 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)). Thus, when the defendant in this case contacted the dealer, he became the link in 
the chain of events, which facilitated the drug transaction that resulted and therefore the 
defendant arranged the sale of drugs. The defendant brought the dealer and the Officers 
into contact with each other, which facilitated the transaction and whereby the 
defendant's intent can be inferred. Therefore, the facts in this case are different than in 
Hester, such that the defendant in this case took steps to facilitate the drug transaction, 
which establishes the quantum of evidence necessary to bind this case over for trial. 
B. The Proper Standard for this Case to be Decided Under is State v. Gray. 
Even if this Court decides that the facts in this case are not distinguishable from 
Hester, the State contends that the proper standard to decide this issue is from the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986). The Court in Hester. 
dismissed the bindover because "the State's evidence would require the fact-finder to 
speculate as to Hester's intent to arrange a sale." Hester, at 7. This would require the 
State to offer evidence of the subjective intent of each defendant in every case, thm \ 
intent in this case. 
Moreover, the State contends that under Gray, the subjective intent of each 
defendant is irrelevant and the objective actions of the defendant should control instead. 
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"We stated that any witting or intentional lending of aid in the distribution of drugs, in 
whatever form the aid takes, is proscribed by the act." State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 
1320 (Utah 1986). In Gray, the defendant was convicted under this statute for driving a 
third party to the dealer's home to obtain drugs for the undercover agent and for puffing 
the drug's quality. The Court held that the defendant's involvement was enough to 
uphold the conviction. 
In the case at bar, the defendant arranged a meeting between the dealer and 
Officer Portel for cocaine. The defendant gave Officer Portel the number to the dealer 
from which a drug transaction resulted. Consequently, the defendant's involvement was 
the link that facilitated the drug transaction, which makes him culpable under this statute. 
The defendant's actions aided in the distribution of the drugs, however unwitting his aid 
might have been. Under an objective view of the defendant's actions, he aided in the 
distribution of drugs. Therefore, the actions of the defendant objectively make him 
culpable under this statute. 
Further, "[w]e also pointed out that it is not necessary for the defendant to receive 
any value in exchange for the drugs to be convicted under the statute." Id. at 1320. 
Therefore, the defendant's intent can be inferred from his involvement in the transaction 
even though he was not present during the transaction and he was not compensated. 
"Were it otherwise, the arranging of drug sales would be perfectly legal, so long as it was 
done gratuitously. The aim of the law is to make the arrangement of drug sales unlawful, 
whether they be profitable or not." State v. Harrison. 601 P.2d 922,924 (Utah 1979). 
Therefore, the defendant's action from an objective standard satisfy the elements 
of the statute and proved sufficient evidence to bind the defendant over for trial. 
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C. The Defendant Was Properly Charged as Required bv State v. Hill. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hill, required the State to charge the 
defendant in that case under the Controlled Substances Act in the Utah Code where the 
State charged Hill with theft by deception for selling baking soda to an agent claiming it 
to be cocaine. 688 P.2d 450 (Utah 1984). The Court stated that when a statute governs 
conduct then the defendant should be charged with that offense. In this case, the 
defendant's actions are specifically proscribed by Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (l)(a)(ii) 
(1953), where the defendant arranged the distribution of a controlled substance. The 
defendant arranged a meeting between Officer Portel and a dealer and provided a number 
by which a drug transaction transpired. "Consequently, where specific conduct is 
proscribed by the Imitation Controlled Substances Act, its provisions should control as 
mandated by § 58-37-19." State v. Hill 688 P.2d 450, 451 (Utah 1984). Further, "§ 58-
37-19 of the Controlled Substance Act is applicable to Chapter 37b offenses since the two 
acts are integrally connected." Id. at 451. Therefore, the defendant's conduct in this act 
meet the elements under this statute and so has been properly charged. 
CONCLUSION 
A magistrate should bind a defendant over for trial unless the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issues, which supports the 
prosecution's claim. Pledger. 896 P.2d at 1229. At the preliminary hearing, the State 
produced evidence that the defendant made arrangements by telephone for a drug sale. 
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The defendant called a dealer and provided a meeting place for the drug transaction to 
take place. When the Officers refused to give the defendant a ride to the meeting, the 
defendant stated that the transaction would only occur if he were present. Nevertheless, 
the Officers used the number to the dealer provided by the defendant and went to the 
place of the meeting provided by the defendant, which resulted in a drug sale. Therefore, 
based on these facts, the objective actions of the defendant qualify him to be properly 
charged under the distributing statute and the defendant's motion to quash the bindover 
should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \ \ day of July, 2000. 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney 
KELLER. SHEFFIELD 
Deputy District Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum In 
Support of the State's Motion in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion to Quash the 
Bindover was delivered to JAMES A. VALDEZ, attorney for Defendant, JOSE 
MORALES-TORRES, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on 
the ) 4 - day of July, 2000. 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum D 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t *ED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 2 0 2000 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
JAMES A. VALDEZ #3308 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
E-mail: ivaldezfo),sllda.com 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DIVISION 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOSE MORALES-TORRES 
Defendant 
ORDER QUASHING BINDOVER 
AND REMANDING TO PRELIMINARY 
HEARING MAGISTRATE. 
CaseNo.001904616FS 
CAO 00-00-5277 
JUDGE WILLIAM BARRETT 
The above-captioned matter having come on for hearing on the 20th of July, 2000, the 
Defendant JOSE MORALES-TORRES, represented by his attorney James A. Valdez, the States 
representative Deputy District Attomey, Kelly R. Sheffield. 
The evidence presented was the Preliminary Hearing transcript, case law, Memorandums 
and brief argument by attorneys. 
The court having carefully read the transcript, memorandums and case law, finds that in 
review of State v. Hester. 2000 UT App 159, (2000) released after the preliminary hearing in this 
matter, the State has failed to so a "Quantum of Evidence" necessary to bind over, in that: (1) the 
conversation that defendant had with a so called dealer was not understood by Officer Portel 
because it was in the Spanish language and she did not understand what was said nor to whom; 
(2) it was clear that defendant never had any drugs; (3) defendant never mention "cocaine or any 
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other drug; (4) police officers broke off negotiations with defendant and he walked off; 
officers made further contact with drug dealer(s) on their own, conducted negotiations and; 
(6) there was no evidence that defendant had anything to do with the dealers that the officers 
eventually consummated a drug transaction. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the bind over in the above entitled matter be Quashed 
and the matter be remanded to the Magistrate Court for further hearing. 
DATED this [day of July, 2000. 
WILLIAM BARRETT, JUDGE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ELLY RL SHEFFIELD 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the District Attorney, 
231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this day of July, 2000. 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
KELLY R. SHEFFIELD, 5869 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
00005277 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSE MORALES-TORRES, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 001904616 
Hon. Anthony B Quinn 
Based upon the motion of the Plaintiff and in the interests of justice, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the information in the above-entitled matter be 
dismissed. / 
DATED this $ day of August. 2000. 
BYTHE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS and 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL was delivered to James A Valdez, Attorney for Defendant Jose 
Morales-Torres at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the O day 
of August, 2000. 
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